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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an 
order of the district court granting defendants' motion to 
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. See City of Philadelphia v. 
Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("Beretta"). On 
this appeal, we determine whether the defendant gun 
manufacturers can be liable under negligence, negligent 
entrustment, or public nuisance theories for costs incurred 
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by plaintiffs, principally the City of Philadelphia, associated 
with the criminal use of handguns. For the reasons we set 
forth below, we answer this question in the negative and 




Plaintiffs, City of Philadelphia (the "City") and five civic 
organizations (the "organizational plaintiffs"),1 brought suit 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania, against defendants, 14 out-of-state gun 
manufacturers, asserting claims of public nuisance, 
negligence, and negligent entrustment under Pennsylvania 
law. Plaintiffs do not contend that defendants violated any 
of the federal or state laws specifically regulating the sale 
and distribution of firearms in the United States and in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.2 Instead, plaintiffs allege 
that defendants' conduct in the marketing and distribution 
of handguns allows them to fall into the hands of criminals 
and children, creating and contributing to their criminal 
use in Philadelphia. Plaintiffs assert that their injuries 
include the costs associated with preventing and 
responding to incidents of handgun violence and crime. See 
app. at 34 (Compl. PP 79-80) (listing costs including those 
associated with criminal justice administration, police 
services, emergency medical services and educational 
programs). 
 
The defendants timely removed the case to the district 
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship and, following 
removal, moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).3 By opinion and order dated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Joining the City are ASPIRA, Inc., a civic group providing services for 
Latinos; the Guardian Civic League of Philadelphia, Inc., a membership 
organization largely of minority police officers; Residents Advisory 
Board, 
an umbrella organization for public housing residents' councils; 
Northeast Home and School, a high school parents' organization; and 
Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth, a children's advocacy 
group. See app. at 11-12 (Compl. PP 3-7). 
2. See Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 887-88 (summarizing applicable 
regulations). 
 
3. The district court analyzed plaintiffs' standing to sue under both 
Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court concluded, with respect to Rule 12(b)(1), 
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December 20, 2000, the district court concluded, inter alia, 
that plaintiffs failed to state claims for negligence, negligent 
entrustment, and public nuisance. Thus, the district court 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice,4  following which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that the organizational plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III's 
standing 
requirements. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to the extent that the 
organizational plaintiffs advanced claims because it found no causal 
nexus between the defendants' conduct and the alleged injuries of the 
organizational plaintiffs' members and because the action cannot 
proceed in the absence of the participation of the members of the 
organizational plaintiffs' groups who actually sustained damages. See 
Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 895-97 (recognizing that damages of 
organizational plaintiffs' members "are not common to the entire 
membership, nor shared by all in equal degree") (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). We are in agreement with the district court and 
thus will affirm the order for summary judgment with respect to the 
organizational plaintiffs on jurisdictional grounds. See South Camden 
Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., ___ F.3d ___, ___ 
n.13, No. 01-2224, 2001 WL 1602144, at *14 n.13 (3d Cir. Dec. 17, 
2001). We nevertheless consider the case on the merits under Rule 
12(b)(6) as the City's Article III standing is not questioned or in doubt 
and we may not be required in all circumstances to consider standing 
before considering the merits of a party's case. See Maio v. Aetna Inc., 
221 F.3d 472, 482 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, it should be 
understood that although we refer to the organizational plaintiffs in our 
discussion of the merits of the case, we are dismissing the action as to 
them under Rule 12(b)(1). 
 
4. In addition to determining that plaintiffs fail to state claims, the 
district court also concluded that the claims of the City, but not the 
organizational plaintiffs, are barred by the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Firearms Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6101 et seq. (West 2000) ("UFA"). 
Section 6120 of the UFA limits the City's power to regulate firearms. See 
Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (citation omitted). The district court 
found that section 6120(a.1), which prohibits home rule municipalities 
from suing gun manufacturers for the production and distribution of 
firearms except in certain contract or warranty actions, bars the City's 
claims. See id. at 890. The City contends that the UFA does not bar its 
action for public nuisance because the UFA only bars suits for the 
"lawful" manufacture of firearms and does not preclude claims of 
"unlawful" conduct. The City further challenges the constitutionality of 
the statute, claiming that its cause of action vested before section 
6120(a.1) became law and that the deprivation of its right to sue violates 
both due process and the separation of powers doctrine. 
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plaintiffs timely appealed.5 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We exercise plenary review on this appeal. See Children's 
Seashore House v. Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 658 (3d Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1275, 120 S.Ct. 2742 (2000). 
Of course, we can affirm the order for dismissal"only if, 
accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as 
true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, 
Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re 





A. Public Nuisance 
 
A public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public." Camden County Bd. 
of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 
536, 539 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Camden County") (citations and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Additionally, the district court concluded that the City may not recover 
funds expended on law enforcement and health services under the 
municipal cost recovery rule. See id. at 894-95 (quoting the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court for the proposition that "[t]he cost of public 
services for protection from a safety hazard is to be borne by the public 
as a whole, not assessed against a tortfeasor whose negligence creates 
the need for the service") (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). There is, however, some authority for the proposition that 
public entities may recover damages for the costs of abating public 
nuisances. See City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). 
 
We need not address these alternate grounds for dismissal, because, 
as stated infra, plaintiffs fail to state claims for negligence, negligent 
entrustment, or public nuisance. Moreover, the UFA does not deny the 
City Article III standing. 
 
5. The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1332 and 1441 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
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internal quotations omitted) (affirming dismissal of public 
nuisance claim against gun manufacturers under New 
Jersey law in Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 245 (D.N.J. 2000)). The 
courts traditionally have limited the scope of nuisance 
claims to interference connected with real property or 
infringement of public rights. Id. (citing W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts S 86 at 617-18 (5th ed. 
1984)). Thus, in Camden County we observed that the 
scope of nuisance law has "returned to its more narrow 
focus on these two traditional areas." Id. at 540. Moreover, 
"[f]or the interference to be actionable, the defendant must 
exert a certain degree of control over its source." Id. at 539 
(citation omitted); see, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974) 
(defendants controlled mine with acid drainage); Muehlieb v. 
City of Philadelphia, 574 A.2d 1208, 1209 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990) (defendant kept at least 20 dogs on residential 
street); Groff v. Borough of Sellersville, 314 A.2d 328, 329- 
30 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (defendants owned dilapidated 
building). 
 
In Camden County we observed that "no New Jersey 
court has ever allowed a public nuisance claim to proceed 
against manufacturers [of] lawful products that are lawfully 
placed in the stream of commerce." Camden County, 273 
F.3d at 540. Likewise, the parties here do not present any 
Pennsylvania case allowing such a claim. Indeed, we 
indicated in Camden County that "[t]o extend public 
nuisance law to embrace the manufacture of handguns 
would be unprecedented nationwide for an appellate court." 
Id. at 540-41; see also Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C- 
3664, 1998 WL 142359 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1998) (dismissing 
nuisance claim against gun manufacturer).6  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Thus, courts enforce the boundary between public nuisance law and 
product liability. See, e.g., Camden County, 273 F.3d at 540 (stating that 
otherwise, public nuisance law "would become a monster that would 
devour in one gulp the entire law of tort") (citation omitted). Although 
plaintiffs do not plead this case "as a classic products liability action, 
there is no escaping that [the] action is dependent on [defendants'] 
having supplied the [product]. Thus, regardless of how [plaintiffs] 
pleaded [their] claims, they include a products liability aspect." Angus 
v. 
Shiley, Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Further, public nuisance is a matter of state law, and it 
is not the role of a federal court to expand state law in ways 
not foreshadowed by state precedent. See Camden County, 
273 F.3d at 541. Instead, a federal court follows the 
precedents of the state's highest court and predicts how 
that court would decide the issue presented. See id. 
Pennsylvania precedent does not support the public 
nuisance claim plaintiffs advance here, and we cannot 
predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will choose to 
expand state public nuisance law in the manner plaintiffs 
urge. See Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 101 
(3d Cir. 1994) (stating that, when deciding diversity case, 
" `[F]ederal courts may not engage in judicial activism. 
Federalism concerns require that we permit state courts to 
decide whether and to what extent they will expand state 
common law. . . . Our role is to apply the current law of the 
jurisdiction, and leave it undisturbed.' ") (quoting City of 
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 123 (3d 
Cir. 1993)).7 
 
Moreover, the gun manufacturers do not exercise 
significant control over the source of the interference with 
the public right.8 Consequently, the causal chain is too 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) plaintiffs have supplied us with the 
opinion in James v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, No. ESX-L-6059-99 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law. Div. Dec. 11, 2001), which involved claims that are 
similar to but broader than those in this case. We note that the court in 
James took a different approach than we take, as it pointed out "that the 
New Jersey courts are not loathe to enter into new territory where a loss 
has been suffered." Slip op. at 16. Moreover, the James court was critical 
of our opinion in Camden County which it stated did not bind it. Id. at 
21. While we do not doubt that a New Jersey state court need not follow 
Camden County, we regard that case as significant authority on this 
appeal which, however, we are deciding under Pennsylvania law. In this 
regard we point out that we have commented previously when deciding 
issues of Pennsylvania law contrary to New Jersey law that we "predicate 
our ruling on more conventional principles" than those underlying the 
New Jersey case. See Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 
F.3d 210, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1999). We doubt that if confronted with the 
complaint here that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would uphold it. 
 
8. In Camden County, we rebuffed the plaintiffs' arguments that 
"proximate cause, remoteness, and control" were not essential to a 
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attenuated to make out a public nuisance claim. See 
Camden County, 273 F.3d at 541 (finding that, even if 
public nuisance could encompass the lawful manufacture 
of handguns, the manufacturers nonetheless fail to exercise 
sufficient "control" over the source of the interference with 
the public right to be liable under a nuisance theory); 
Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-01941 CA-06, 1999 WL 
1204353, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (dismissing 
public nuisance claims under Florida law and stating that 
gun manufacturers "have no ability to control" third parties' 
misconduct), aff 'd, 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001). See also City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 
Nos. C-990729, C-990814, C-990815, 2000 WL 1133078, 
at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000) (affirming dismissal of 
nuisance claims against gun manufacturers), appeal 
allowed, 740 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001). 
 
In Camden County we found that "even if the requisite 
element is not always termed `control' . . . a degree of 
control by the defendant over the source of the interference" 
is required and that the "causal chain" connecting gun 
manufacturers to the damages claimed by the City of 
Camden was "simply too attenuated to attribute sufficient 
control to the manufacturers to make out a public nuisance 
claim." Camden County, 273 F.3d at 541. In this case, as 
the district court observed, plaintiffs' "sole allegation of 
control [is] that the gun manufacturer[s] do not adopt 
policies which would place restrictions on the activities of 
the federally licensed firearms dealers." Beretta, 126 F. 
Supp. 2d at 901. Further, as in Camden County , "[t]he gun 
manufacturers supply their products to adult, independent 
federally licensed firearms dealers. The defendants are not 
in control of the guns at the time they are misused, nor do 
they control the independent firearms dealers." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
public nuisance claim. Camden County, 273 F.3d at 541. But see 
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 
2000) (stating in dictum that public nuisance claim"do[es] not require 
proximate cause"). Because of this court's statement in Allegheny 
General Hospital, the district court declined to analyze proximate cause 
in this case. See Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 903 n.14. 
 
                                12 
 
 
Accordingly, as plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable public 
nuisance claim against the gun manufacturers under 
Pennsylvania law, and as defendants lack the requisite 
control over the interference with a public right, we will 
affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' public 
nuisance claim. 
 
B. Negligence and Negligent Entrustment9 
 
The district court found that plaintiffs' negligence-based 
claims failed for lack of proximate cause because their 
injuries are too remote from the gun manufacturers' alleged 
conduct. See Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (citations 
omitted).10 The doctrine of remoteness provides that "a 
plaintiff who complain[s] of harm flowing merely from the 
misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's 
acts [is] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to 
recover." Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 
258, 268-69, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1318 (1992) (citation 
omitted); see also Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare 
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 928 (3d Cir. 1999) 
("Steamfitters") (applying doctrine in suit against tobacco 
manufacturers), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105, 120 S.Ct. 844 
(2000). Thus, a plaintiff who cannot establish " `some direct 
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious 
conduct alleged' " fails to plead "a key element for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The elements of a negligence claim include: a legal duty, a breach of 
that duty, a causal relationship between the defendant's negligence and 
plaintiff 's injuries, and damages. See Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 
461 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). Negligent entrustment involves: 
 
       permit[ting] a third person to use a thing or to engage in an 
activity 
       which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or 
should 
       know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to 
       conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an 
       unreasonable risk of harm to others. 
 
Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03 (citing Ferry v. Fisher, 709 A.2d 399, 
403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)). 
 
10. The district court also found that plaintiffs failed to allege facts 
sufficient to sustain a claim of negligent entrustment, as they did not 
allege that the gun manufacturers "directly entrust [their weapons] to 
individuals who are likely to use them in a negligent or criminal way." 
Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
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establishing proximate causation, independent of and in 
addition to other traditional elements of proximate cause." 
Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Laborers Local 17") 
(quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. at 1318), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1080, 120 S.Ct. 799 (2000). Accordingly, 
"an injury that is too remote from its causal agent fails to 
satisfy tort law's proximate cause requirement." 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 921. 
 
Remoteness is analyzed through the following six factors: 
(1) the causal connection between the defendant's 
wrongdoing and the plaintiff 's harm; (2) the specific intent 
of the defendant to harm the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the 
plaintiff 's alleged injury and whether it relates to the 
purposes of tort law; (4) whether the claim for damages is 
highly speculative; (5) the directness or indirectness of the 
alleged injury; and (6) the aim of keeping the scope of 
complex trials within judicially manageable limits, i.e., 
avoiding the risks of duplicative recoveries and the danger 
of complex apportionment. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted); Steamfitters, 
171 F.3d at 924 (same). 
 
Thoroughly applying the six factor analysis, the district 
court concluded that there is a weak causal connection 
between the gun manufacturers' conduct and the City's and 
the organizational plaintiffs' injuries. The court found that 
the gun manufacturers did not intend harm to plaintiffs; 
that plaintiffs' claims were "entirely derivative of [those of] 
others who would be more appropriate plaintiffs"; that tort 
law preferred a more balanced approach to recovery; and 
that plaintiffs' damages were too speculative to permit 
recovery. Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 906. 
 
In its analysis, the district court examined the route a 
gun takes from the manufacturer to Philadelphia streets, 
finding it "long and tortuous." Id. at 904. First, the 
defendant manufacturers sell guns to licensees; second, the 
licenses sell the guns to dealers; third, the dealer sells it to 
a lawful purchaser acting as a straw buyer; fourth, the 
straw buyer transfers the weapon to a criminal or a youth; 
fifth, the transferee uses the gun to commit a crime, or the 
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youth injures himself or a companion; and finally, demand 
on the City's or the organizational plaintiffs' resources is 
increased. See id. at 904; Appellants' Br. at 82.11 
 
Plaintiffs try to shorten the causal chain by arguing that 
the "thriving illegal market . . . injures [them], even before 
any guns acquired in the illegal market are actually used in 
the commission of a crime." Appellants' Br. at 75. This 
statement, however, does not reduce the links that separate 
a manufacturer's sale of a gun to a licensee and the gun's 
arrival in the illegal market through a distribution scheme 
that is not only lawful, but also is prescribed by statute 
with respect to the manufacturers' conduct. We reiterate 
that gun manufacturers first ship their guns to 
independent, federally licensed distributors and dealers. 
Only then may the licensed dealer sell the gun to a 
purchaser who has been cleared by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and approved by the Pennsylvania state 
police. See 18 U.S.C. S 922(t)(1); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 6111(b)-(c) (West 2000). Although the purchaser may be a 
"straw" purchaser (a friend, relative or accomplice who acts 
as purchaser of the weapon for another) who then traffics 
the gun to prohibited purchasers for illicit purposes, the 
straw's dealings are not with the manufacturers. 12 
Moreover, straw purchases are not the only means by 
which guns allegedly reach the "illegal market," and the 
chain is likely much longer and more varied.13 
 
Further, as the district court observed, plaintiffs do not 
contend that the gun manufacturers "intend  to inflict injury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We have taken our description of the distribution route in part from 
the plaintiffs' brief which includes more physical steps than the court 
set 
forth. 
12. Every straw purchaser commits a federal felony and violates 
Pennsylvania law by falsely stating that he or she is not buying the 
firearm for someone else. See 18 U.S.C.SS 924(a)(1)(A), (a)(2); 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 6111(g)(2), (g)(4) (West 2000). 
 
13. Additionally, despite plaintiffs' attempt to shorten the causal chain, 
the gravamen of the complaint is that guns are used in crime, with 
resulting deaths and injuries to City residents, prompting much of the 
expenses plaintiffs claim as damages. See app. at 11, 14-15, 17, 20-22, 
24-26, 28-30, 34-35, 38-39 (Compl. PP 1, 10-12, 15-16, 24-29, 41-47, 
61, 79, 82, 97). 
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upon the citizens of Philadelphia or to augment 
institutional costs." Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 904 
(emphasis in original). At most, they allege awareness of the 
means by which prohibited purchasers end up possessing 
handguns. See id.; app. at 18 & 25 (Compl.PP 17(b) & 42).14 
 
The derivative nature of the City's and the organizational 
plaintiffs' injuries also adds to the remoteness. Plaintiffs 
assert that they suffer "direct" and "independent" injuries 
involving some expenses that an injured resident cannot 
recover. Appellants' Br. at 81, 95; see also Appellants' 
Reply Br. at 26 (listing economic and educational costs, in 
addition to costs to "investigate and prosecute gun 
trafficking, to patrol gun infested neighborhoods . . . [and] 
to wash the blood off city streets after a shooting"). 
However, the fact that some of plaintiffs' damages are 
different from the damages suffered by direct victims of gun 
violence makes them no less derivative. See Laborers Local 
17, 191 F.3d at 241 (union funds' claims rejected even 
though individual smokers could not bring RICO actions); 
City of Cincinnati, 2000 WL 1133078, at *8-9 & *11 
(affirming dismissal of municipal lawsuit against gun 
manufacturers). 
 
Furthermore, it is clear that plaintiffs seek 
reimbursement for expenses that arise only because of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. At oral argument, counsel for the City argued that the complaint 
alleged intent on the part of the gun manufacturers. Having read the 
complaint, we find that, at most, it alleges the gun manufacturers' 
knowledge that some handguns reach prohibited purchasers. See, e.g., 
app at 10-11, 17-19, 21-23, 24 (Compl. PP 1, 17, 27-31, 40). Plaintiffs' 
claim of intent rests on a series of government reports concerning the 
process whereby firearms used in crime are traced as part of a law 
enforcement investigation. However, trace request information does not 
inform law enforcement agencies that a particular licensed distributor or 
dealer has committed an illegal act. Consequently, the trace request 
information does not put a gun manufacturer on notice that a specific 
distributor or dealer is engaged in unlawful firearm trafficking. 
See Department of Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, Commerce in Firearms in the United States at 22-23 (2000) 
(available online at <http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/ 
020400report.pdf>); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 
1065 & n.7, n.8 (N.Y. 2001). 
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use of firearms to injure or threaten City residents. Those 
immediately and directly injured by gun violence-- such as 
gunshot wound victims -- are more appropriate plaintiffs 
than the City or the organizational plaintiffs whose injuries 
are more indirect. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors of California, 
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
542, 103 S.Ct. 897, 910-11 (1983) (stating that"The 
existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self- 
interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the 
public interest . . . diminishes the justification for allowing 
a more remote party . . . to perform the office of private 
attorney general."); Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 228 F.3d at 440; 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927.15 
 
Additionally, plaintiffs' damages are speculative as it 
would be difficult to calculate how many incidents could 
have been avoided had the gun manufacturers adopted 
different policies. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 926-28 
(finding damages claim speculative). Moreover, as the 
district court noted, "for each individual injury, 
independent factors obviously come into play, such as 
criminal conduct, drug or alcohol abuse, or other 
misconduct by the owner." Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 905 
(citation and internal quotations omitted). Finally, any effort 
to compensate plaintiffs would require the expenditure of 
enormous judicial resources to determine which defendants 
should bear what percentage of liability. See Camden 
County Bd. v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
 
In addition to holding that absence of proximate cause 
bars plaintiffs' claims, the district court also properly 
concluded that the gun manufacturers are under no legal 
duty to protect citizens from the deliberate and unlawful 
use of their products. See Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 898- 
903 (analyzing factors and stating that "[T]he recognition of 
the legal duty for manufacturers to victims of gun violence 
is a matter properly addressed to Congress or the 
Pennsylvania Legislature."); see also Mazillo v. Banks, No. 
3742-C of 1984, 1987 WL 754879, at *2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We are not suggesting that we have a view on whether persons 
directly injured by gun violence successfully can advance a claim against 
gun manufacturers as that possibility is not an issue here. 
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Feb. 6, 1987) (stating that "[N]o common-law duty exists 
under Pennsylvania law upon the manufacturer of a non- 
defective firearm to control the distribution of that product 
to the general public. Furthermore, no common-law duty 
exists under Pennsylvania law upon the remote vendor for 
marketing its product to people whom they should have 
known would have misused the product."), aff 'd, 536 A.2d 
833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); accord Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (finding no duty under 
New York law). Moreover, as we recognized in Camden 
County, "[i]n the negligence context . . . a defendant has no 
duty to control the misconduct of third parties." Camden 
County, 273 F.3d at 541 (citation omitted). 
 
In sum, there are more direct victims, and the fact that 
these individuals may not be able to seek recovery for 
certain public services borne by the City or the 
organizational plaintiffs in no way obviates the fact that 
they are, nonetheless, the more directly injured parties. The 
causal connection between the gun manufacturers' conduct 
and the plaintiffs' injuries is attenuated and weak. Further, 
if we allowed this action, it would be difficult to apportion 
damages to avoid multiple recoveries and the district court 
would be faced with apportioning liability among, at 
minimum, the various gun manufacturers, the distributors, 
the dealers, the re-sellers, and the shooter. 
 
Accordingly, we will dismiss plaintiffs' claims that tort 
liability should be assessed against gun manufacturers 
when their legally sold, non-defective products are 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court entered December 20, 2000. 
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